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Low Maturity or Sensible Practice
Peter Axel Nielsena  and Jacob Nørbjergb
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Department of Informatics, Copenhagen Business Schoolb
Abstract
Software Process Improvement efforts rely heavily on the use of software capability maturity 
models. These models are used to identify problems in an organization’s software processes and 
point to, and prioritize, necessary improvements. Using models for this purpose will, however, 
automatically turn our attention to certain problems and issues and ignore others. In this paper we 
argue that the maturity models provide only one perspective on software processes and software 
process problems. We demonstrate how we, by looking at the organizational context of and the 
conflicts and uncertainties facing software projects may uncover alternative interpretations of 
software practices, and identify other problems. The implications for SPI and for the use of 
maturity models are discussed.
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1.Introduction
Organizations developing computer-based information 
systems struggle with unexpected incidents, unstable 
requirements, staff shortages, rapid technological 
developments, unclear or conflicting statements 
from users and customers. These and other problems 
contribute to uncontrollable projects, runaway 
budgets, and delayed products of inferior quality.
Over the years software professionals have come to 
accept this as unavoidable conditions for information 
systems development but they have also realized that 
systems development organizations must improve 
their ability to control these risks and uncertainties 
and manage their software projects. As a consequence 
the field of Software Process Improvement (SPI) 
developed. Integrated in SPI is the concept of - 
software process - maturity; a measure or expression 
of the strengths and weaknesses of an organization’s 
software development and management practices. 
Maturity is defined through so-called maturity models; 
e.g. the Capability Maturity Model or CMM (Paulk 
et.al. 1993) and Bootstrap (Kuvaja et. al. 1994). The 
models define maturity in terms of levels, where each 
level is described through a specific set of management 
and development practices and procedures. The 
higher the maturity level, the better the expected, 
overall performance in terms of accuracy of schedules 
and budgets, product quality, and productivity. The 
models support SPI initiatives in two ways: First, they 
can be used to assess an organization’s maturity level 
by comparing the organization’s development and 
management practices with the model, and second 
they can help  prioritize improvement initiatives by 
pinpointing the changes needed to reach a higher 
maturity level.
The idea of software process maturity emerged 
at the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) in the 
early 1980s (Humphrey 1989), and the institute’s 
Capability Maturity Model (CMM) is among the first 
and most influential of the maturity models. The CMM 
describes maturity in terms of five levels, from level 
1 (Initial), characterized by the absence of even basic 
project management practices to level 5 (Optimizing) 
with organization-wide management and development 
practices and extensive use of process and product 
measurements to monitor and continuously improve 
performance. The model, which describes the levels 
in great detail to reduce ambiguity, was developed by 
the SEI in close collaboration with the US software 
industry. It is accompanied by training programs for 
assessors as well as detailed guidelines and procedures 
for assessments and maturity evaluations (Dunaway & 
Masters 1996, Paulk et.al. 1993). 
The significant contribution of the CMM is its 
embodiment of an improvement strategy. According 
to the CMM an organization at a certain level shall 
focus on the improvements needed to reach the next 
higher level first; thus, an organization at level 1 should 
implement the basic project management practices 
specified at level 2, before attempting to undertake 
the more demanding implementation of organization-
wide development and management standards required 
to reach level 3 and so on.
The SEI developed the CMM on a direct contract 
from the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) that 
wanted an instrument to evaluate potential contractors, 
and the DoD now requires software vendors to be at 
level 3 or higher for large or complex projects before 
they can be considered for DoD projects (Saiedian & 
Kuzara 1995). This has of course created much interest 
in the CMM especially in the US software industry, 
particularly as early assessments indicated that over 
80% of US software organizations were below this 
level (Goldenson & Herbsleb 1995).
Other organizations in the US and elsewhere who 
are not involved in DoD contracts are, however, also 
using maturity models as a way to improve their 
software process capability. This, in turn, has lead to 
increased interest in maturity models and a number of 
competing models have emerged during the 1990’s; 
e.g., the Bootstrap project funded by the European 
Union (Kuvaja et. al. 1994), and the SPICE model 
(Enam et. al. 1998), intended to encompass all previous 
models. SEI’s CMM has had significant influence on 
the concept of maturity and all the subsequent models, 
however, and we will use this model as our “reference” 
in the rest of this article.
Considering the size and importance of the software 
industry, it is no wonder that there is considerable 
debate and research about the concept of maturity in 
general and the maturity models in particular. Some 
researchers suggest to improve the maturity models 
by adding new sets of practices and procedures;  e.g. 
Sawyer et. al. (1997), suggest a three-level maturity 
model for requirements processes, and others suggest 
to include organizational learning and knowledge 
management capabilities in the models, since these 
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seem to be related to software process maturity 
(Baskerville & Pries-Heje 1998) or to the success of 
improvement projects (Stelzer et al. 1998).
Another – more fundamental – discussion concerns 
how maturity models and maturity assessments are 
used to guide SPI. The maturity assessment process 
may itself be flawed due to immature assessment 
techniques, the questions used or the training of 
assessors (Bollinger & McGowan 1991, Smith et. al 
1994, O’Connel & Saiedian 2000) and maturity models 
may not be applicable across different types of software 
producing organizations or in all countries (Baskerville 
& Pries-Heje 1998, Edgar-Newill 1994, Mathiassen & 
Sørensen 1996, Sharp et al. 1999, Velden et al. 1996). 
Some authors have gone even further and challenged 
the maturity idea as such. High maturity levels require, 
according to the founding fathers of the models, 
documented processes and extensive use of process and 
product metrics to control and continuously improve 
performance, but some critics argue that today’s 
successful software production depends on innovative 
capability, creativity and the ability to adapt to a rapidly 
changing environment, not on standardized processes 
and detailed measurements. Hence higher maturity 
levels may actually be harmful instead of beneficial to 
a software organization (Bollinger & McGowan 1991, 
Bach 1994, Bach 1995, Kohoutek 1996).
The debate about the maturity models and the 
maturity concept has, however, suffered from a 
general lack of systematic research into the theoretical 
and empirical foundations of the maturity concept 
and the maturity models. Such research should aim 
at establishing the models’ applicability and validity 
more firmly.
In this paper we will show how the maturity 
models represent only one possible perspective 
on software processes The models embody basic 
software engineering ideas of sound development 
and management practices which can be found in 
any textbook on software engineering; e.g. (Pressman 
2000, Sommerville 2001). Thus, a maturity model 
based assessment of an organization’s software 
processes, will focus on the presence – or absence – of 
these practices and ignore other aspects of software 
processes. We will argue, however, that by looking at 
the software processes in their organizational context 
and drawing on theories of organizational conflicts 
and politics we can draw another – and equally valid 
– picture of an organization’s software processes and 
how to improve them.
We evaluated the practices of a group of software 
project managers (PM) in a small software producing 
organization from the point of view of the CMM. This 
did not constitute a complete maturity assessment of 
the organization but the PMs’ accounts of their own 
practices are sufficiently complete to allow us to 
assess their practices as immature (level 1) using the 
concepts and criteria from the CMM. If we include the 
organizational and technical conditions under which 
the PMs work in our evaluation of their practices, 
however, then we come to see these as both sensible 
and rational ways to cope with the contradictions and 
uncertainties the PMs must deal with in their day-to-
day effort to complete their projects.
By further relating our observations to other studies 
of organizational behaviour in software development 
we show that the PMs’ practices, and the organizational 
conditions underlying them, are by no means local or 
incidental but caused by fundamental structural 
conflicts and contradictions that can be found in 
most organizations. By drawing on general theories 
of organizational conflicts and politics we finally 
argue that this organizational perspective on software 
practice questions the feasibility of the improvements 
recommended in the CMM based evaluation.
2.The research approach
The research results presented here build on data 
collected through a three year action research project 
in a Danish software organization. Action research 
is an approach that through active intervention 
simultaneously attempts to achieve practical value 
for a client organization and to contribute to scientific 
knowledge (for more details about action research, 
see f. ex. Checkland (1991) or Avison et al. (1999)). 
The project lasted from 1997 to 1999 and through this 
period the authors, together with other researchers 
and external consultants were engaged in the 
organization’s SPI project. We participated in regular 
meetings in the internal group responsible for the SPI 
project and cooperated with developers and project 
managers in specific improvement initiatives. We 
have documented the research by tape-recordings and 
minutes of all meetings where we have been present, 
by tape-recorded interviews with project managers and 
middle managers, and in field notes and diary entries. 
The documentation also consists of reflective papers 
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written during the action research project (e.g., Iversen 
et al. 1999).
The primary data source for this article are interviews 
with 7 out of 10 project managers about their software 
development practices. The interviews took place 
from June to August 1997. Following Patton’s (1990) 
techniques for qualitative interviewing we used an 
open-ended interview guide and the interviews were 
tape-recorded and subsequently transcribed. The 
original purpose of the interviews was to identify the 
project managers’ perceptions about the company’s 
software process problems (Iversen et al. 1999) and 
much of the interview text therefore deals directly 
with process problems. Our present focus is however 
on the organizational and political aspects of software 
processes and we have therefore re-read the interviews 
from this perspective, working closely with the text 
trying to let it speak for itself. Each of us has carefully 
read the text and noted what we found to be significant. 
We have compared our notes and settled on categories 
of issues. We have then read the text again looking for 
quotes confirming or disconfirming our categories. The 
final categories and the quotes illustrating the categories 
form now the basis of the case description. We will not 
claim that this resembles an impartial grounded theory 
approach as put forward by Strauss & Corbin (1990), 
because our long-time engagement with the company 
may well have lead us to form interpretations that 
others would not have been able to.
Secondary data sources come from our continued 
action research effort after the interviews. This has 
allowed us to closely observe  the project managers 
in other situations, to view their actions in a long-term 
perspective, and to work with several viewpoints on 
how to interpret their perceptions and their actions. 
We have at many occasions tried to influence project 
managers and others; e.g. top-management as well as 
developers and this serves as a context against which 
we judge our interpretation of the interview text. The 
context helps us to triangulate our findings and it 
provides a broader perspective for making sense of the 
project managers’ statements.
3.The Case
The interviews took place in the development 
department of a company that develops leading edge 
measurement instruments and systems. A typical 
product consists of one or more measurement 
instruments - microphone, thermometer, accellerometer 
or other, sometimes with embedded software 
– connected to a PC with analysis and presentation 
software. Most projects have both a hardware and a 
software part but they are run as integrated projects 
under a common project manager. Larger projects can 
be divided into separate hardware and software sub-
projects, each with their own project manager.
The department is managed by a technical director 
who reports directly to the board. The department and 
the projects work closely together with marketing, 
sales, and production departments.
 The company had been through a long re-
orientation and downsizing process due to increased 
competition and set-backs in one of the company’s 
major markets, prior to our engagement. Immediately 
before our entry the development division went through 
a Bootstrap assessment where it was concluded that 
most of the company’s software process problems 
concerned project management, configuration 
management, testing, the development process model, 
and requirement specification.
In the following descriptions of the project managers’ 
practices we will focus on three broad process areas: 
estimation and planning, resource allocation, and 
requirements management. These areas include a major 
part of the project managers’ responsibilities, they are 
discussed in depth in most of the interviews and they 
vividly illustrate the uncertainties and organizational 
contradictions they must cope with.
3.1 Estimates and Planning
The company does not maintain a database of hard 
experience data to support the estimation and planning 
of the projects. The project managers therefore base 
their estimates and plans on past experience and the 
judgment and estimates of team members. The project 
managers use the plans to get an overview and control 
over activities and deadlines. They do not, however, 
expect schedules to hold and they know they have to 
reschedule often.
The planning process is however often disturbed 
by directives from management, time pressure and 
uncertainty about the requirements as illustrated in this 
extract from an interview with an experienced project 
manager:
“The time schedule was decided 
beforehand: We had to finish by 
a certain month so I really didn’t 
have [estimation and planning] 
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problems. I made some rough 
plans for the requirement 
specification phase. [Some] were 
right, others were completely 
wrong. So I stopped doing that. 
The requirement specification 
phase has been much longer than 
planned. We should have been 
ready by April/May but were 
not completely finished until 
August. … I’ve used a lot of time 
on setting up schedules in this 
project; [we’ve] agreed on some 
rough plans; and then we’ve tried 
to navigate from those [plans].”
This project manager might not agree with the original 
schedule set by management, but he did not openly 
discuss it. Furthermore, his own original estimates for 
the requirements specification phase proved to be far 
too optimistic. He managed, however, to re-schedule 
and control the project anyway and at the time of the 
interview he was confident that he would deliver 
within one month after the originally set date. This 
estimate proved to be right.
Other project managers are less fortunate and 
struggle continuously with unrealistic schedules:
“We got five days to write the 
requirements specification for 
[X]. That sort of set the stage 
for the whole project. We had 
thought of at least four months 
to [investigate] different types of 
users and verify concepts; but no, 
[the management] thought that 
we could save a lot of time by 
declaring ‘You’ve five days’.”
The project actually did manage to write a specification 
in five days, but it was very superficial and the project 
never came to believe completely in it, according to 
the project manager.
Project X was originally scheduled to produce a 
version 1.0 of the product in 10 months. It took the 
project group 16 months to produce a beta-version and 
another three months to complete version 1.0.
The above examples show that the estimation 
and planning processes are heavily influenced by 
the product delivery plan produced by the technical 
director together with the other directors. The plan 
outlines features of next years’ products and tells 
the sales department when demo versions of new 
products are to be ready, when they can begin selling 
the product, and when delivery actually will take place. 
The schedule lists the products’ general features and a 
first step in a project is to write a more detailed product 
description based on this feature list. The following 
extract from an interview with a project manager shows 
an important aspect of this.
“... [management] announces 
next year’s products before there 
is a requirements specification 
or anything. That means that we 
launch projects based on mere 
headlines because we have to.”
The project managers realize that this is a perfectly 
reasonable approach from a marketing and sales 
point of view. Without a launch schedule the sales 
representatives would be unable to plan their sales 
efforts and cater for the customers’ needs and demands. 
It is a difficult situation to bring the project managers 
in, however. On the one hand they understand the 
need for a product launch schedule, but they cannot 
make their project plans based on it. Even worse, they 
are required to estimate a development project from 
product feature “headlines” only.
When a project is underway, there is immense 
pressure to deliver on time. The technical director is 
under pressure from the other divisions and from top 
management and he presses the projects to deliver 
as expected. The sales representatives on their side 
are under pressure from the market because of their 
commitments to deliver to the customers according to 
the launch schedule.
Summarizing the above we can say that the project 
managers really try to estimate and schedule their 
projects; they know basic planning and management 
techniques and estimate, as well as possible, based on 
past experience, but they find that this doesn’t help 
them cope with the management problems they face. 
The result can be a rather cynical attitude towards 
planning as expressed in the following quote from a 
manager of a delayed project:
“You gave your best shot and 
after some time you’re “beyond 
time schedules” because it didn’t 
matter, you just had to complete.”
5
Nielsen and Nørbjerg: Assessing Software Processes: Low Maturity or Sensible Practice
Published by AIS Electronic Library (AISeL), 2001
© Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, 2001, 13: 21-3426
SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLE - Asessing Software Processes
27© Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, 2001, 13: 21-34
Asessing Software Processes - SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLE
3.2 Resource Allocation
Resource allocation in the company concerns two 
issues: what projects to start and the allocation or 
removal of manpower called resources to or from 
projects.
The company faces a severe shortage of software 
developers with the specialized knowledge about 
measurement instruments and analysis algorithms 
required to develop the company’s products. There 
is therefore an ongoing struggle between project 
managers to have enough developers with the right 
qualifications allocated to projects.
“When we started we were 
two technical project managers 
… one for Windows software 
and one for [signal processing] 
software. There were eight 
[developers] on Windows 
software and five on [signal 
processing]. That was 20 less 
than what we’d asked for.”
Project managers find other ways to deal with the 
shortage. Developers cannot be allocated to a project 
that is not officially started, but some project managers 
are nevertheless able to create so called ‘drawer 
projects’. A ‘drawer project’ is a project initiated by 
a project manager without explicit approval from the 
technical director. If the project manager eventually 
succeeds to obtain formal support for the project 
it will emerge from the project managers drawer 
and officially start. Several of the project managers 
we interviewed reported that their – now officially 
approved – projects were begun as drawer projects.
“It has been running since … it’s 
one of the political spheres … 
in principle … officially it was 
started a month ago [July 1997]. 
Unofficially, it … started in late 
February.”
It is of course almost impossible to apply proper 
processes in drawer projects as they are a cover-up of 
what is actually going on.
It is not clear how project managers manage to 
allocate resources to drawer projects, but it appears 
that at least some of these projects have been able to 
obtain a semi-official status. The following extract 
concerns a project that had been running for years and 
had produced several versions of the product without 
being officially defined as a project, and without a plan 
and estimates:
“Interviewer: To go on with 
this project you needed 
project team members with 
particular qualifications. These 
qualifications were not available 
in the market and you couldn’t 
move people around in the 
company. You then [hired] new 
people and trained them for half 
a year. Then they were ready to 
enter the project.
Project manager: That’s exactly 
the situation here.”
The project managers perceive the resource allocation 
process as sometimes arbitrary. One project manager 
reports about his difficulties getting his project 
underway:
“You see, it was a direct order 
from management on how to 
prioritize.[Unfortunately], our 
key programmer was tied up in 
maintenance work ... so there was 
very little work done until after 
summer.”
To overcome this problem the project manager had to 
convince the technical director to reallocate developers 
from other projects. This is always a problematic thing 
to do partly because it may hurt relations to other 
project managers, partly because the developer himself 
may resent being moved.
A final quotation illustrates what another project 
manager perceives as a paradox concerning resource 
allocation: producing an estimate requires manpower 
that he can’t get without an estimate.
“[Getting resources] ... it is like 
a vicious circle. If there isn’t 
anybody on the project, then ...it’s 
hard to make an estimate. And 
without an estimate you don’t get 
any people, right?”
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3.3 Requirements definition and manage-
ment
The company’s official project model prescribes 
that projects produce a requirements specification 
to be approved by the project’s steering committee. 
This committee is also supposed to approve all 
later changes to requirements. There is, however, 
considerable variation in how individual projects find, 
describe, and later change and manage requirements. 
At the time of the interviews a few projects were in 
the process of adapting a new requirements definition 
process with systematic use of scenarios, use cases and 
prototypes. This approach spread gradually to other 
projects over the following years and was incorporated 
in the company’s quality system by 1999. At its best 
therefore, requirements definition is based on project 
seminars to brainstorm ideas, peer reviews, visits to 
customers, and testing prototypes internally and at 
customer sites. The project managers reported that this 
could be a time consuming process, but that it resulted 
in detailed, and very useful specifications.
Other projects take requirement specification more 
lightly:
“It has been characteristic for 
this project from day one that it 
has been absolutely informal. It 
is probably the biggest ‘drawer 
project’ ever. … [Through 
the whole project] there has 
been no formal requirement 
specification.”
The project concerns a system to support certification 
of audio devices according to five different national 
standards. It never produced a requirements 
specification, but used the national certification 
standards as a substitute and managed to produce 
several releases of the system. The standards do not, 
however, mention central aspects of a computerized 
system, e.g., the user interface.
The pressures put on the projects to meet deadlines 
mean that they are not always able to systematically 
manage requirements. They perceive themselves as 
being under the combined pressure from the technical 
director who wants them to meet the set dead-line and 
a marketing department that tries to push as many 
features as possible into the product without concern 
for time and development costs. For the project 
managers it becomes more important to meet deadlines 
with a functioning product than implementing all 
requirements and they are therefore prepared to simply 
strip requirements.
“Interviewer: What happens when 
you approach the dead-line?
Project manager: You’ll have to 
adjust your own ambitions for the 
project. How many nice-to-have 
features do you throw away?”
Requirements changes are formally approved in 
the steering committee as noted above. In practice, 
however, the project managers assume responsibility 
for requirements changes, eventually with subsequent 
approval in the committee. The following project 
manager thus displays extreme confidence in his 
overview of the market and his ability to make the 
right decisions regarding requirements:
“No, [the changes] are approved 
by the project manager. I take 
the decision. I don’t necessarily 
go out and ask a large part of the 
market … OK, I have the insight 
into market needs that it requires. 
“
The project managers partly blame this practice on the 
delays inflicted by the slow and bureaucratic approval 
process. To avoid these delays the project managers 
might also simply postpone the formal requirements 
review and sign-off procedure for as long as possible.
4. Evaluating practice
The practices described above are no doubt 
problematic. However, as we will show in this section, 
the interpretation of the practices, the problems 
identified, and the solutions suggested, depend heavily 
on the framework used to assess them.
4.1 A CMM perspective
The CMM defines maturity in terms of five levels 
as described earlier. Each level describes a set of 
development practices and management procedures 
that must be in place and followed for an organization 
to qualify for that maturity level. CMM level 2 
7
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describes processes within the following six general 
areas
•   software project planning
•   requirements management
•   software project tracking and oversight
•   software configuration management
•   sub-contractor management
•   software quality assurance.
The descriptions of the project managers’ practices in 
the previous section fall within the first two of these 
and a comparison with the specification of CMM level 
2 reveals severe weaknesses within both areas - the 
following evaluation is based on Paulk et al. (1993), 
pp. 59-60):
Software Project Planning
The CMM requires that projects follow a systematic 
and documented estimation and planning process, 
and that all parties commit themselves to approved 
plans and schedules. The plan and the schedule should 
include available and allocated resources. 
This requirement is, as we saw above, not met 
in the company’s software projects. The project 
managers do make estimates and plans, but they see 
their effort as being confounded by fixed delivery 
dates, and insufficient resources, both with regard to 
time and people, to perform requirements analysis 
and subsequent estimation and planning in a proper 
way. Furthermore, resource allocation seems to be 
ad hoc and political and not linked to estimates and 
schedules.
As a result, the project managers themselves don’t 
believe in the – documented – plans, but simply try to 
deliver as soon as, and when possible. In this process 
they may rely on their own, unofficial development 
plan and their agreements with developers.
Requirements Management
Software requirements should be documented and 
approved and all changes to requirements should be 
carefully controlled, according to the CMM. Changes 
to requirements should be reflected in plans and 
schedules.
We described above how not all projects document 
and control requirements. Some projects don’t have 
a requirements specification while others keep the 
specification fluid for as long as possible. Requirements 
may be changed or removed at the project manager’s 
discretion without previous approval from the steering 
committee.
Thus, a CMM assessment of the company’s 
software processes would result in recommendations 
for considerable changes within these two areas [1]. 
One thing in particular would need to be improved: 
namely the way commitments are established and 
maintained. The concept of commitment forms the 
basis for several of the CMM’s recommendations and 
is intended to capture the mutual agreements about; e.g. 
plans, resources, schedules etc. that actors in software 
development projects make. Humphrey  explains the 
elements of making a commitment in this way:
1.  The person making the commitment does so 
willingly.
2.  The commitment is not made lightly; that 
is, the work involved, the resources, and the 
schedule are carefully considered.
3.  There is agreement between the parties on what 
is to be done, by whom, and when.
4.  The commitment is openly and publicly stated.
5.  The person responsible tries to meet the com-
mitment under all circumstances, even if help 
is needed.
6.  Prior to the committed date, if  it is clear that 
it cannot be met, advance notice is given and 
a new commitment is negotiated (Humphrey 
1989, p.70)
In the CMM these elements are operationalized in the 
form of several practices and procedures. It is obvious 
that commitments are not made and maintained in 
this way in the company. The project managers are 
for example ready to accept a fixed delivery date or 
a project schedule based on “shaky grounds” and to 
work according to their own ’unofficial’ plan until it 
becomes obvious that the ‘official’ plan is unrealistic. 
Upper management, on the other hand, will not commit 
itself to the project managers’ schedules but enforces a 
fixed deadline.
4.2 Organizational practice
The CMM’s assessment and advice is sensible and 
useful from a pure software engineering perspective: 
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The company’s projects do suffer from time and 
budget overruns and there are defects in the products. 
So there is room for improvements. Our involvement 
with the organization makes us, however, question the 
CMM assessment and the feasibility of the ensuing 
recommendations.
Through the interviews and through our intervention 
into the company we have come to see it as an 
organization characterized by: contradictory demands, 
structural conflicts, limited resources, uncertainty and 
change, and we will argue that other, more complex 
explanations of the process problems are needed 
in order to properly identify feasible and sensible 
solutions, if such solutions exist at all in all cases. 
We will now discuss how the specific organizational 
conditions in the company make the project managers 
behave in the unsystematic and seemingly irrational 
way described above.
The project managers face contradictory demands. 
They are for example under considerable pressure 
from the marketing and sales departments and the 
technical director to deliver according to the launch 
schedule already communicated to the sales force. On 
the other hand, everybody wants fault-free code with 
high usability that meets the complex needs of the 
customers. These requirements are contradictory in 
the sense that they cannot be fulfilled simultaneously 
by all projects. To the project managers, the products’ 
quality depends on their ability to experiment with the 
technology and the requirements, but experimentation 
creates planning uncertainties, and they are therefore 
less comfortable with a fixed delivery date.
“Interviewer: Can one say that 
there is a contradiction between 
you and your need to experiment 
and management’s need to have a 
[delivery] date.
Project manager: Yes, that’s the 
paradox.”
Project managers consequently understand estimates 
as political statements and delivery dates as something 
to be continuously negotiated. Some even – in their 
own words – “collect excuses” in case something goes 
wrong in their project.
There are conflicting interests in the organization; 
particularly concerning the limited development 
resources. It is in the interest of the project managers 
to have adequate resources. This will effectively enable 
them to handle some of the other uncertainties they 
face. The technical director, on the other hand, wants to 
provide the projects with as few resources as possible 
in order to be able to start more projects or reduce 
costs. It is in the interest of the project managers to 
have developers with specific competencies allocated 
to their projects, but the technical director needs to 
maintain a flexible work force where competence can 
be moved around depending on need. 
The limited resources create conflicts among 
the project managers and between them and upper 
management. The project managers’ competition for 
available resources takes both subtle and outspoken 
forms. When the competition is latent the project 
managers will try to influence the technical director’s 
decisions about staffing of projects. It is not uncommon 
that the technical director has promised a project 
manager a developer, but no developer is available. 
When the competition is more manifest a project 
manager might go to the technical director and argue 
that he should have a developer from another project 
under less pressure.
There is uncertainty in any development process. A 
promising new, but crucial technology may be delayed 
or it turns out to be less useful than anticipated. Some 
requirements may turn out to be much more complex 
to realize than expected. The marketing department 
might change its mind; it proves impossible to find and 
hire needed resources, etc. The project managers live 
with these uncertainties and they attempt to be on top 
of the situation, but they are often taken by surprise. To 
reduce uncertainty they need time to experiment and 
systematically search for new and relevant information, 
but this collides with the processes defined in the 
company’s quality system and the demand to deliver 
on time:
“It is impossible to follow the 
models in practice. Instead you 
do what comes natural – to make 
a kind of ... iterative prototype 
development. This should be 
legalized instead of turning [us] 
into some kind of criminal – a 
‘closet criminal’.” 
There is change in the projects’ environment. The 
organizational structure is changing when new 
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managers are hired and others leave. Project creation 
or termination leads to changes in the development 
department and fluctuations in product sales or size 
of market segments may reshape the whole company. 
To a project manager significant changes also occur 
when resources and thereby knowledge leaves the 
company.
“Almost all knowledge [relevant 
to this project] had disappeared 
from the company [by] January 
1997. For a long time in the 
beginning of 1997 there were 
literally no development 
activities [in the project]. 
New personnel, without deep 
knowledge of [the application 
domain] were hired in the second 
quarter. Training them was a 
major effort ...”
From this perspective we come to see the project 
managers as competent actors in a highly contradictory 
and complex organizational environment. They want 
to produce usable products without too many defects, 
and reasonably close to an acceptable delivery date. 
Fluid or incomplete requirements, ‘drawer projects’, 
illicit prototypes, and rough, missing or outdated 
plans are, in this light, not simply immature software 
practices, but can be understood as strategies to 
protect their project and themselves and to ensure 
the success of the projects they are responsible for 
in an environment of uncertainty, contradiction, and 
conflict.
4.3 Organizational politics
Above we interpreted the project managers’ practices 
as means to steer their project through contradictory 
demands, organizational conflicts and uncertainties 
regarding product features, technology and staffing. 
Thus we saw the practices as symptoms of underlying 
causes embedded in the company. 
What we have described may be seen as irrational 
behaviour from individual project managers or others 
in the company. We will argue, however, that what we 
have seen in “the company” is merely the outcome of 
organizational processes that can be found in many 
software organizations. Studying at these processes 
and the theories that explain them can give us a deeper 
understanding of the project managers’ practices and 
also reveal problems and limitations in the CMM’s and 
other maturity models’ perspective on organizations.
In a recent study Linberg (1999) observes that 
developers find that management sends conflicting 
signals about the relative importance of schedule, 
time, quality, and cost in software projects. Kautz 
et al. (2001) present a similar example where such a 
problem situation was resolved by a strategy which is 
not included in the CMM. The developers in Linberg’s 
study also report about deliberate initial underestimation 
of projects in order to secure project approval. The 
inevitable ensuing delays and cost overruns therefore 
came as no surprise to the developers. The study further 
shows that the developers and managers do not agree 
on what it means for a project to be successful. When 
asked to assess the success or failure of a project, the 
developers considered factors such as interesting and 
challenging work and the quality of the end-product, at 
least as important as meeting budgets and deadlines.
Keil & Robey (1999) have interviewed IS auditors 
about the handling of troubled IS projects. To 
handle troubled IS projects requires that somebody 
communicates the bad news to somebody else who can 
do something about it, but the message may be delayed 
because nobody wants to transmit or act upon news 
of a troubled project out of fear of the consequences. 
“Blowing the whistle” – as Keil & Robey call it – or 
terminating a troubled project may be perceived as 
“career suicide” because of the vested interest and 
prestige in the project, and the bad news may simply 
be ignored by managers with the power needed to act 
on troubled projects.
“The would-be whistle blower 
must wield sufficient power to 
challenge [the] conviction [that 
project completion is critical].” 
(Keil & Robey 1999, p. 83)
Both Linberg’s and Keil & Robey’s studies supplement 
our interpretation of the project managers’ practices. In 
each their way they open up for alternative explanations 
of the project managers’ practices, than those offered 
by a maturity assessment. Following Linberg we can 
see how different actors in the company hold different 
views on projects and how to manage them; i.e. the 
PMs and management do not agree upon how to 
schedule a project or how to handle uncertainties. 
Following Keil & Robey we can also see that bad 
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news are rarely communicated in the company and 
that differences of opinion are rarely voiced in front of 
the technical director. In fact, there is a cover-up of the 
different perceptions in form of the ‘drawer projects’ 
and some project managers collect excuses to defend 
their self interest and their projects.
The question is what causes this kind of behaviour 
and what – if anything – can be done to change it. The 
concept of commitment discussed above is certainly 
one way to explain the behaviour. Most of our 
observations in the company, as well as those reported 
by Linberg, resp. Keil & Robey can be explained 
through reference to lack of commitment to an open 
and rational planning and management process. In 
the case of the company it is obvious that a dedication 
to open and shared commitments and an agreement 
on goals and ways to meet them are necessary 
prerequisites for improvements. 
This interpretation of the situation is however 
based on a conventional notion of commitment 
assuming that commitment among others is an all 
positive phenomenon - as discussed and challenged 
by Abrahamson (2001) - and leaves open the 
question of what lies behind the missing dedication 
to commitments. This question cannot be explained 
within the framework offered by maturity models. We 
need to turn to other, more complex perspectives on 
organizations and organizational behaviour.
We find that the concept of organizational 
politics, though broad and without clear and concise 
definitions, can offer some explanations. Drory & 
Romm (1990) write that theories on organizational 
politics “indicate that formal organizational processes 
such as decision and policy making, goal setting, and 
resource distribution are not conducted predominantly 
by rational considerations which represent the best 
interests of the organization.” (p. 1133). They draw 
a comprehensive picture of organizational politics 
encompassing such elements as self-serving behaviour, 
acting against organizational goals, concealment of 
motives, informal behaviour, uncertainty in decision 
making, and organizational conflicts.
Through an extensive literature survey Drory & 
Romm (1990, p. 1147) come to define organizational 
politics as a combination of the following three 
elements: influence, informal means, and conflict. 
Our descriptions of the practices of the PMs clearly 
demonstrate the presence of all three elements of 
organizational politics.
We can go even further based on Knights & Murray’s 
(1994) study of conflicting management priorities 
in information systems development. Knights & 
Murray argue that IS organizations are dominated by: 
competing, politicizing, and conflicting groups. The 
conflicts are, however, not caused by simple power 
struggles, personal ambitions or ‘turf guarding’, but 
are the results of conflicting views on what is best for 
the organization. These views influence and are at the 
same time shaped by personal ambition, departmental 
loyalties, different world views, and structural conflicts 
over priorities
“… it is impossible and 
misleading to separate off the 
albeit problematic pursuit of self 
or sectional interests from those 
of the organization itself. Rather, 
it is through the construction, 
negotiation and reappraisal of 
self, collective and organizational 
interests that the fragile reality 
of an organization is sustained, 
reproduced and changed.” 
(Knights & Murray 1994, p. 29)
Therefore – according to Knights and Murray – there 
can be no right or universally valid organizational goal 
or strategy. Broken down to the day-to-day business 
of producing software and information systems, this 
means that there is no over-all goal within which to 
define and prioritize work; there is only an ongoing 
political struggle.
In this light then, we can argue that the project 
managers in the company see themselves as perfectably 
capable to determine what is in the best interest of 
the company and their environments behaviour as 
obstacles for successful projects. Other actors; e.g. 
the technical director, the marketing department etc. 
may have other ideas of what is ‘best’ and are therefore 
not necessarily ready and willing to accept the project 
managers’ views, priorities, actions etc.
For the project managers it is therefore important to 
do what they can to maintain and enlarge the space in 
which they have the power to act in what they see as 
the best interest of the company in more or less open 
conflict with other actors; i.e. they invent ‘drawer 
projects’ to create a space for exploring exciting 
new possibilities, they circumscribe or short circuit 
‘bureaucratic’ approval and change control procedures 
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to maintain project momentum, and they use whatever 
means possible to get the resources they need for their 
project.
4.4 Changing practice
This is not to say that there isn’t room for 
improvements in the company’s software processes. 
But how can the situation be improved? The PMs’ 
strategies are simplistic and serve to obscure the 
underlying problems rather than expose and improve 
them. A maturity assessment on the other hand will 
just point to a number of weak processes and produce 
a prioritized list of necessary improvements. 
In our view the uncertainties and structural conflicts 
facing the project managers must be surfaced and 
removed as a precondition for implementing any 
change. Kautz et al. (2001) demonstrate how this may 
be done when process consultants consciously assume 
the role of political agents. However this approach 
may not always be feasible. 
Furthermore, from Knights and Murray’s (1994) 
perspective on organizational politics we can interpret 
CMM-inspired improvements as a way to make 
development projects more transparent to, e.g., higher 
levels of management and thus reduce the scope of the 
project manager’s control. To willingly accept such a 
change requires that the project managers trust other 
groups in the company to accept their perception of 
what is ‘best’ for their projects. Based on previous 
experience, however, the project managers may 
assume that this is not the case, and that any sign of 
openness therefore will be exploited by others at the 
project managers’ expense. Adopting this perspective 
we may therefore expect that improvement initiatives 
will be accompanied by new attempts to maintain 
project control as manifested by ‘drawer projects’, 
uncontrolled requirements changes, withholding of 
information and other strategies.
5. Conclusion
Models of software process maturity provide a 
particular way to assess software processes with a 
focus on the lack of maturity and lack of rationality. In 
this article we have shown that by seeing organizations 
as political, rather than rational, we can provide an 
explanation of software – and in particular project 
management – practices that is different from the one 
offered by the CMM and similar maturity models.
It is not easy to base advice for SPI from our 
analysis. One approach could be to supplement a 
traditional maturity assessment with an investigation 
of the organizational contexts of software practices 
to uncover and remove ‘organizational causes’ and 
obstacles for improvement. Even this approach may, 
however, be problematic. From a political perspective 
SPI itself can be seen as a way to change the balance of 
power in a software producing organization, a change 
which may inspire new struggle over the control of 
software projects. 
The purpose of maturity models is to guide 
assessments and change of software practices. They 
are based on a traditional software engineering 
perspective and like any model, they rest upon certain 
assumptions about reality, exposing certain aspects of 
software processes and organizations at the expense 
of others. Thus, using the maturity models to assess 
software organizations will turn our attention to certain 
problems and recommendations and leave out others. 
We have demonstrated, through an example, that some 
of the issues overlooked in a maturity assessment, but 
surfaced by looking at the software practices from 
another perspective, may prove to be severe obstacles 
for the implementation of improvements. This does 
not falsify the CMM or similar maturity models, but 
does, in our view, underline the need for more research 
aiming at understanding the theoretical underpinnings 
of the maturity models and their practical implications 
to better understand under which conditions we can use 
the models to guide improvement efforts.
Notes
[1] A complete CMM assessment falls outside the scope of this paper, but it would expose weaknesses within several of the 
other level 2 areas too.
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